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Abstract
Background: Since the global economic crisis, a harsher economic climate and global commitments to address the 
problems of global health and poverty have led to increased donor interest to fund effective health innovations that 
offer value for money. Simultaneously, further aid effectiveness is being sought through encouraging governments 
in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to strengthen their capacity to be self-supporting, rather than 
donor reliant. In practice, this often means donors fund pilot innovations for three to five years to demonstrate 
effectiveness and then advocate to the national government to adopt them for scale-up within country-wide health 
systems. We aim to connect the literature on scaling-up health innovations in LMICs with six key principles of 
aid effectiveness: country ownership; alignment; harmonisation; transparency and accountability; predictability; 
and civil society engagement and participation, based on our analysis of interviewees’ accounts of scale-up in such 
settings. 
Methods: We analysed 150 semi-structured qualitative interviews, to explore the factors catalysing and inhibiting 
the scale-up of maternal and newborn health (MNH) innovations in Ethiopia, northeast Nigeria and the State of 
Uttar Pradesh, India and identified links with the aid effectiveness principles. Our interviewees were purposively 
selected for their knowledge of scale-up in these settings, and represented a range of constituencies. We conducted 
a systematic analysis of the expanded field notes, using a framework approach to code a priori themes and identify 
emerging themes in NVivo 10.
Results: Our analysis revealed that actions by donors, implementers and recipient governments to promote 
the scale-up of innovations strongly reflected many of the aid effectiveness principles embraced by well-known 
international agreements - including the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. Our findings show variations in 
the extent to which these six principles have been adopted in what are three diverse geographical settings, raising 
important implications for scaling health innovations in low- and middle-income countries. 
Conclusion: Our findings suggest that if donors, implementers and recipient governments were better able to put 
these principles into practice, the prospects for scaling externally funded health innovations as part of country 
health policies and programmes would be enhanced.
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Background
Donor interest in funding health programmes that demonstrate 
effectiveness and value for money is intensifying, prompted by 
the global economic crisis and global commitments to address 
health and poverty problems embodied in the Sustainable 
Development Goals. One of the common approaches adopted 
by donors is to fund implementers to undertake innovative 
pilot health projects and programmes over finite periods to 
provide evidence of effectiveness, and then advocate recipient 
governments for their adoption and scale-up within country 
health programmes and systems. However, as this paper 
explores, this is challenging to achieve in practice, something 
others have also commented on.1-5 
Scale-up
There is an extensive literature on factors facilitating and 
undermining the scale-up of innovations in health and other 
sectors. In this paper, in which we look at innovations piloted 
using external donor funding, with government support 
sought for taking them to scale, we define ‘innovation’ as a 
community-based approach to enhancing maternal and newborn 
health [MNH], which may be new or had been introduced 
elsewhere, but is being implemented in a new context. These 
encompass an innovation’s attributes, including simplicity; 
comparative advantage over alternatives and whether benefits 
are observable; the ‘receiving environment,’ including the 
attitudes and needs of potential adopters; and the influence of 
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” B t by contrasti g this fiction 
with global health research “driven by cris s, hot issues, and 
the concerns of orga ized i terest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provi ed by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be cont sted to become
political, and such a contestation co cer s public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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Implications for policy makers
• By embracing the principles of aid effectiveness and cooperation, policy-makers, donors and implementers of health innovations will enhance 
the prospects of government being able to take those innovations to scale and bring about improvements in health services and systems.
• Policy-maker engagement throughout the process of scaling-up health innovations is key to ensuring that previously externally funded 
innovations fit with national health priorities, policy frameworks and targets.
• Government commitment to engage and work with donors and implementers can help to realise the aid effectiveness principles and improve 
health systems and services in low and middle-income countries, but this will take time.
Implications for the public
The internationally agreed aid effectiveness principles encourage greater cooperation between donors, implementers and governments that receive 
aid and can help those governments to adopt and expand the reach of health service innovations for mothers and babies, which received pilot 
funding from external sources. Such cooperation will contribute to providing health services that meet the needs of the population and improve 
public health. The principles include government ownership of innovations, aligning them with national health priorities, and coordinating donors 
and implementers. Moreover, if these three groups can develop a trusting relationship, through sharing information and creating transparency and 
accountability, it enhances coordination. Added to this, is recognition of the important contribution civil society can make through working with 
government to identify local health priorities and feasible ways to address them.
Key Messages 
community opinion leaders and policy champions.6-15 Health 
systems, political, economic and social contexts also influence 
whether innovations are scaled up including the capacity, 
training and attitudes of health workers and the strength of 
commodity logistics and supervision systems onto which new 
innovations might be layered.6,9,10,13,16,17 Decision-makers’ ideas 
and ideologies often shape which health issues are prioritised 
and which policies and programmes are financed within the 
constraints of a country’s economic resources. Innovation 
adoption by local communities is influenced by health needs, 
beliefs, sociocultural values and norms, and access, which may 
be constrained by economic and geographical barriers.18-21 
We define scale-up as: government adoption and 
implementation of health innovations, increasing geographical 
reach to benefit a greater number of people beyond externally-
funded implementers’ programme districts. We conducted a 
qualitative study to explore the factors influencing scale-up 
of MNH innovations in Ethiopia, northeast Nigeria and Uttar 
Pradesh, India. Specifically, we identified the main actions 
that implementers can adopt to catalyse innovation scale-up 
and the influence of geographical contexts on scale-up.4,11 
A strong emerging theme in our analysis, which we report 
in this current paper, was that donors, implementers and 
recipient governments’ actions for promoting innovation 
scale-up also reflected many of the principles embraced 
by well-known international aid effectiveness agreements. 
Indeed, these three countries are signatories to the 2005 Paris 
Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda 
for Action and the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation.22-25 Both Ethiopia and Nigeria 
signed the International Health Partnership Plus (IHP+) 
Global Compact in 2007,26 and have since signed country 
compacts committing to operationalise effective development 
cooperation in their health sectors. 
Aid Effectiveness and Health Programmes 
For many years, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
have depended on funds from bilateral donors, global 
initiatives and philanthropic foundations for implementing 
health programmes. Yet this method of funding programmes 
has well-documented problems – often known as problems 
of aid effectiveness – including poor alignment between 
what donors fund and recipient countries’ priorities; 
short-term and unpredictable donor funding; and donors 
introducing parallel systems and processes for implementing 
programmes, supplying commodities, and monitoring and 
reporting programme effects. These factors can burden 
recipient governments and undermine their ownership of 
programmes.27-32 
A desire to improve aid effectiveness, led representatives from 
LMICs, major donors, leading civil society organisations and 
United Nations (UN) agencies to agree principles that donors 
and recipient country governments should adopt. While 
the terminology used in these agreements varies, they were 
brought together under the umbrella of the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in 2011.33 
Table 1 provides a summary of six of the major principles 
embraced by these declarations. An emerging theme from 
the analysis of our interview data was that these factors were 
strongly associated with scale-up. It should be noted though, 
that there are several other aid effectiveness principles 
including: managing for results; South-to-South cooperation; 
private sector involvement; and gender equality and women’s 
empowerment.
While there has been progress towards adopting some of these 
principles, change has not been universal. ‘Some unfavourable 
practices’ remain,30 including ‘vertical’ project funding 
focussed on specific health issues, rather than supporting 
broader health system strengthening, and donors continuing 
to set their own agendas which recipient governments are 
expected to accept. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) also acknowledges that 
aid predictability and donor harmonisation are often lacking; 
and governments have not met targets for domestic health 
expenditure, systems’ strengthening and reforms, or drawn 
civil society into policy discussions.  
This paper aims to connect two fields of study: the scale-
up of MNH innovations, that in their pilot phase had been 
funded by external donors, but where governments were 
involved in taking them to scale, and principles of aid 
Wickremasinghe et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(8), 718–727720
effectiveness in LMICs. While several studies highlight the 
importance of innovations aligning with country priorities 
and that country ownership greatly increases the prospects 
of governments adopting innovations,4,6,7,12-15,28 existing 
literature has not systematically analysed how donors, 
implementers and recipient governments’ adherence to aid 
effectiveness principles affects the scale-up of externally-
funded innovations. These innovations sought either to 
develop existing, or introduce new approaches and many 
aimed to improve government MNH care services in rural 
areas (Box 1). Based on our analysis of our interview data, 
we argue that limited adoption of aid effectiveness principles 
by donors, implementers and recipient governments weakens 
the environment for scaling-up externally-funded health 
innovations.
Methods
We conducted qualitative, semi-structured stakeholder 
interviews in Ethiopia, northeast Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh, 
in these three diverse geographical settings, with a common 
feature of having some of the highest burdens of maternal and 
neonatal mortality in the world. We worked with researchers 
trained in qualitative methods, from the three countries and 
the United Kingdom, to develop a topic guide that we piloted 
at a workshop in Addis Ababa. After minor adaptations 
for each country, trained researchers used this guide when 
conducting 50 interviews for each setting in 2012 and 2013. 
The interviewees were purposively selected for their detailed 
understanding of what is involved in scaling-up MNH 
innovations funded by donors, and represented government 
departments, implementers and development partners 
working on MNH programmes in the settings. Of the 
donor-funded implementers, most worked for international 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) or large local NGOs. 
Others were US-based universities and for-profit consultancy 
agencies. To maintain our respondents’ anonymity, we have 
not referred to specific organisations in this paper. Table 
2 categorises interviewees by broad type, across the three 
geographical settings. The breakdown of interviewee types 
was similar in each setting, although in India, where the private 
sector has a significant role in proving MNH healthcare, we 
interviewed representatives from that sector. 
The MNH projects our interviewees referred to had typically 
received external funding for three to five years, and varied 
in scale from a few districts (India), local government areas 
(Nigeria), or woredas (Ethiopia), to many districts across 
multiple states or regions, and some were part of larger multi-
country grants. Some implementers spoke of innovations they 
had developed which government was now scaling-up, or had 
incorporated aspects of into government practices; others were 
preparing innovations for scale-up. Yet mostly, implementers 
shared the many challenges they had faced when trying, but 
not succeeding in scaling-up innovations. 
All respondents gave informed consent before their interviews. 
Interviews were conducted in private spaces to ensure 
confidentiality and, where agreed, were recorded. Soon after 
each interview, interviewers wrote expanded field notes,35 
setting out details of the interview under topics reflecting our 
research questions and emerging themes, and incorporating 
respondents’ direct quotes. Aid effectiveness issues emerged 
as a strong theme in our early interviews, which the research 
team further explored in later interviewees. 
By using investigator triangulation to compare and agree 
researchers’ interpretations, each set of expanded field 
notes became the work of multiple researchers, thus helping 
reinforce the validity of the results reported. In addition, 
researchers from the United Kingdom and the three study 
countries attended an analysis workshop to reach consensus 
on interpretations and cross-country comparisons. Systematic 
analysis of the expanded field notes was conducted using a 
framework approach to code a priori themes and identify 
emerging themes in NVivo10 as we sought to examine the 
Table 1. Key Aid Effectiveness Principlesa
Aid Effectiveness Principle Definition
Country ownership
Recipient government involvement, buy-in and leadership of externally funded health programmes and donor 
programmes working through and strengthening existing country health systems 
Alignment
Donors and implementers working in alignment with recipient country priorities, policy frameworks and health 
systems
Harmonisation Donors and implementers coordinating programmes
Transparency and accountability Donor and implementer transparency and harmonised monitoring and evaluation indicators
Aid predictability Assurance of longer term and more predictable donor funding
Civil society engagement and participation Government responsiveness to civil society demands
a These principles are included in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005); the Accra Agenda for Action (2008); the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Cooperation (2011); IHP+ (from 2007) and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011).
Box 1. Examples of Innovations for Improved MNH Services
•	 Developing and expanding the roles of frontline health 
workers (including community volunteers) and introducing 
incentives and tools to strengthen frontline workers’ 
performance, including communication materials, mobile 
phone technologies and quality assurance measures
•	 Enhancing healthcare referral systems to expand facility 
deliveries, eg, initiating emergency transport schemes, a 
MNH call centre, and extending the role of community 
health workers to include making referrals
•	 Supporting the community to increase its demand for 
services, by promoting behaviour change and local decision-
making
Abbreviation: MNH, maternal and newborn health.
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actions and factors that catalysed scale-up and the contextual 
factors enabling and undermining it. Aid effectiveness issues 
emerged in our data analysis which we related to key principles 
of aid effectiveness. The emerging themes were categorised 
by two researchers, separately, using an inductive analytic 
framework based on the aid effectiveness principles. When 
they were compared, the two analyses mostly concurred, 
but where there were discrepancies we returned to the data 
to check the most plausible explanation and sought inputs 
from co-authors. We also conducted checks by presenting 
provisional results to interviewees and country stakeholders 
in Lucknow, Addis Ababa and Abuja, who were invited to 
comment and confirm the accuracy of our messages. 
Our analysis and the quotes we have used reflect a balance 
of views from the different stakeholder groups, drawing out 
common views across the full range of stakeholders rather 
than focusing on a select few. Indeed, our analysis suggested 
there was considerable agreement on issues between different 
stakeholder groups.
We received ethics approval from the corresponding 
author’s institute; the Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology; the Regional Health Bureaus of Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP and Tigray regions; the Indian Council of 
Medical Research and SPECT-ERB in India; the Nigerian 
National Health Research Ethics Committee and Gombe 
State Ministry of Health.
Results
We examined ways that embracing each of six key aid 
effectiveness principles fosters scale-up of health innovations, 
and compared and contrasted the extent to which this had 
been achieved in the three settings, including the challenges 
faced. Table 3 presents some of the key features of the aid 
effectiveness principles enabling and undermining the scale-
up of innovations in each of the three geographies, based on 
our analysis of all 150 respondents’ accounts.
Country Ownership: “You Need Government Buy-in at Top, 
Middle and Bottom” 
Country ownership means that government leads a recipient 
country’s development policies and strategies, to which 
donors align their funding. It also refers to strengthening 
government systems through donors’ and implementers’ 
technical support, and using recipient country systems, 
rather than introducing parallel ones. Our respondents 
explained that country ownership is fundamental to scaling-
up innovations; government engagement is required at all 
stages of an innovation’s development, including design, 
implementation and evaluation. Without it, government 
would have little interest or stake in an innovation’s success, 
making its adoption unlikely; ‘Ultimately the owner of scale-
up is [national] government…buy-in and ownership within it 
is important’ (foundation donor, India). Alongside engaging 
government formally, engendering strong ownership from 
influential government officials was vital to scale-up. Hence, 
respondents urged implementers to allow considerable time 
for dialogue and trust building: ‘…relationship management...
with external development partners and the [Ethiopian 
Ministry of Health] – that’s really important...’ (programme 
officer, Ethiopia). Government champions helped foster 
momentum and turned engagement into full government 
ownership: ‘Having a champion at national or state level helps 
push things further...’ (implementer, India). In Ethiopia, our 
interviewees pointed to examples where national government 
commitment of this nature had contributed to scaling-up 
externally-funded innovations for community care provision 
for sick newborns and active management of the third stage 
of labour.
Our respondents asserted that innovations should be 
embedded within health systems to have realistic prospects 
of being scaled. Yet, externally-funded implementers 
continued to introduce their own procedures since using 
weak government health systems was seen as delaying 
implementation, making it difficult for them to demonstrate 
the impact of an innovation to their funders. Our respondents 
acknowledged that this approach undermines country 
ownership, leaving innovations unsustainable and lacking 
the support required to make scale-up possible: ‘...we create 
parallel systems...but after the project ends it’s the end of 
everything...’ (implementer, India). 
Our data revealed variations in the extent to which 
country ownership was potentially achievable across the 
three countries. Ethiopia’s centrally organised control of 
donor-funded health programmes at federal level meant 
implementers required substantial government involvement 
and support – and with sufficient government interest, rapid 
scale-up of an innovation was conceivable. In Uttar Pradesh, 
if an innovation gained the support of influential state-level 
champions, scale-up was possible through mobilisation of 
state-level resources. For example, the support of a government 
official helped foster state government interest in a mobile 
phone tool to support frontline health workers.
Moreover, donor priorities had less of an influence over policy 
implementation, particularly where they did not align with 
state government priorities. In northeast Nigeria, however, 
respondents suggested that government ownership of 
externally-funded innovations was more restrained. Although 
decisions on rural primary healthcare were decided at state 
and district level, low government prioritisation of rural 
primary healthcare has led to reliance on relatively high levels 
of donor-driven support for innovations: ‘Government tends 
to decrease rather than consolidate funding…to priority areas 
Table 2. Breakdown of Interviewees by Type
Category of Interviewees Number Interviewed
Implementers 72
Government officialsa 25
Donor foundations 8
Bilateral donors 8
Multilateral donors 12
Private sector representatives 3
Academics (university lecturers, researchers and 
members of professional associations)
22
a Including national government officials in Ethiopia and Nigeria, among 
them Ministry of Health officials, and state ministry of health officials in 
Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh.
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Table 3. Key Features of Aid Effectiveness Principles Enabling (+) and Undermining (-) Scale-up of Innovations
Aid effectiveness 
Principle
Ethiopia Northeast Nigeria Uttar Pradesh, India
Country 
ownership
(+) National government coordination of donor-funded programmes 
fostered government ownership, increasing the possibility of 
innovations being scaled-up
(-) Limited state funding, meant rural primary healthcare was largely 
donor funded and driven, inhibiting state government ownership 
and scale-up of innovations
(+) State government champions fostered introduction of externally 
funded innovations, increasing the likelihood of them being scaled
(-) Attrition among government officials made ownership of an innovation transitory
Alignment
(+) Externally funded programmes expected to align with national 
health strategies and increasingly, implementers supported 
government work packages, enhancing prospects of innovations 
being taken to scale
(-) Externally funded programmes expected to align with government 
strategies, but limited government coordination of donor activity 
meant potentially scalable innovations were missed
(+) Economic development in India reduced reliance on external 
aid; externally funded innovations have had to align with national 
and state-level government strategies to be considered for scale-up 
Harmonisation
(+) National government-led Technical Working Group on MNH 
strengthened coordination, reducing duplication of donor-funded 
innovations and fostering better information sharing 
(+) Federal government-led Maternal and Newborn Health Core 
Technical Committee encouraged collaboration among some donors 
to avoid duplication of effort
(+) The Health Partners’ Forum enabled partner programmes to be 
mapped to avoid duplication and identify scalable innovations 
(-) NGO implementers’ involvement in the Technical Working Group 
limited to responding to technical queries
(-) Weak capacity of the government’s Maternal and Newborn Health 
Core Technical Committee to coordinate donor-funded innovations 
and programmes 
(-) Health Partners’ Forum had limited engagement from donors 
and leadership from government
(-) Multiple donors and implementers working on parallel health innovations and programmes meant competing interests, priorities and donor-led ways of working, leading to parallel procedures and increased 
health worker workloads, thus reducing their time for implementation
(-) Collaboration among implementers was challenging because of their need to claim attribution for innovation outputs as evidence to report to their funders
Transparency and 
accountability
(+) Technical Working Group promoted better transparency and 
information sharing, which improved understanding of scalability of 
innovations
(-) Transparency hampered by limited government capacity for donor 
and implementer coordination at federal and state levels
(+) Health Partners’ Forum was seen as helping to encourage 
transparency and developing as a space to share information about 
innovations
(-) Health Partners’ Forum was still largely nascent
(-) Parallel donor and implementer monitoring and evaluation and information systems limited opportunities to compare results about innovations and increase understanding
Aid predictability
(+) The pooled Millennium Development Goals Performance 
Fund offered some flexibility for Ministry of Health to fund new 
innovations at scale
(-) Security situation meant donors were becoming reluctant to fund 
pilot innovations for potential scale-up
(+) Relatively high levels of government funding mitigated the 
negative impact of fluctuations in external funding
(-) Some donors continue to emphasise project-based funding, which is vulnerable to shifting global health priorities
(-) Short time frames for donor-funded innovations limited the time available to convince government of their value for scale-up
Civil society 
engagement and 
participation
(+) By working collectively, civil society organisations were beginning 
to influence government decisions and priorities for health
(+) Civil society was starting to influence government decisions and 
priorities for health
(+) Through the Health Partners Forum, government was becoming 
more responsive to civil society organisations advocating on health 
needs
(-) Limited awareness of rights undermined civil society 
organisations’ ability to hold government to account
Key: (+) = enabler, (-) = barrier.
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where donors have shown interest’ (academic, Nigeria). Such 
limited government ownership often left a vacuum at the end 
of projects piloting innovations: ‘Ownership and sustainability 
are not usually achieved - most of the time [implementers] 
finish and go...’ (academic, Nigeria).
Alignment: “It’s About the Idea Hitting the Bull’s Eye” 
Alignment means the focus of aid fits with recipient 
countries’ health priorities, policy frameworks and targets – 
an important step towards fostering country ownership. Our 
interviewees asserted that alignment was critical to scale-
up; donors and implementers must ensure their innovations 
align closely with key national level health policies, namely 
the National Health Mission and corresponding state 
Program Implementation Plans (PIPs) in India, Ethiopia’s 
Health Extension Program and Health Sector Development 
Program IV and the Nigerian National Strategic Health 
Development Plan. Respondents said that if innovations 
helped address policy issues identified by government, they 
had a good chance of government adopting and scaling them. 
For example: a health and nutrition project that was scaled-
up in Uttar Pradesh through the Village Health and Nutrition 
Days; and a voucher scheme to increase demand for RMNCH 
services in slum areas that was later included in the Uttar 
Pradesh PIP. ‘It’s much easier to introduce an innovation within 
government systems than from outside if you want it to be taken 
up…’ (implementer, India). 
Respondents pointed to the perennial problem of implementers 
responding to global or donor priorities to secure funding 
for innovations which do not always correspond to country 
priorities: ‘Donor coordination is weak - there’s a disconnect 
between their programmes and [country] needs...’ (government 
official, Nigeria). Periodic changes in government priorities 
and policies (often arising from incoming leaders or 
administrations) meant that implementers struggled to 
respond if they had committed to fixed deliverables: ‘…there’s 
a fickleness in the entire system’ (implementer, India). 
In Ethiopia, interviewees highlighted the importance of 
alignment: implementers had to be seen as ‘enabling,’ rather 
than ‘threatening or questioning [government]’ (project officer); 
hence they needed to respond to government invitations to 
develop projects, rather than design innovations and then 
advocate for government acceptance. Referring to some 
refresher training for Ethiopia’s Health Extension Workers, 
respondents noted the importance of the government 
identifying the need for an innovation and then implementers 
stepping in to meet it. In India, where economic development 
and corresponding cutbacks in external aid had reduced 
donor influence, it was also vital for externally-funded 
implementers to align their work closely with state priorities 
to be valued by government, while innovations that created 
parallel systems would ‘bite the dust’ (government official). 
In northeast Nigeria by contrast, state governments were 
described as willing for donors to support MNH programmes 
with innovations; whether these aligned with government 
programmes was less of a concern. Yet, as our respondents 
explained, the fact that health is inadequately funded 
decreased the prospects of state government adopting and 
financing an innovation introduced by an externally-funded 
implementer. 
Harmonisation: ‘Donor Coordination Is Key to any Scale-up’ 
Harmonising coordination among donors and their 
implementers includes coordinated implementation of health 
innovations, and using common systems and procedures. 
Our interviewees asserted that harmonisation was important 
for scaling-up innovations since coordinated communication 
with government enabled government to make informed 
decisions about scale-up, and shared information on what 
worked and why helped develop stronger innovations: 
‘Don’t re-invent the wheel. Documentation of what worked 
and lessons learnt is very important’ (implementer, Nigeria). 
Additionally, interviewees stressed that poor harmonisation 
put pressure on the health system. One example is where 
health workers’ workloads increased when donor innovations 
and programmes introduced parallel procedures – thereby 
limiting their capacity to implement programmes at scale: 
‘Every new programme...you have a new set of forms...that adds 
a lot of workload...’ (implementer, India).
Despite wide acknowledgment of the importance of 
harmonisation, our respondents reported perennial problems 
making it difficult to achieve in practice. These included 
the large number of donors and implementers working on 
parallel innovations and programmes, the continued focus 
on ‘vertical’ project funding, and donors’ competing interests, 
priorities and ways of working. Implementers were competing 
for finite donor financial resources, were under pressure to 
deliver results within ambitious timeframes and attribute 
outcomes to specific programmatic efforts that were easier to 
measure if working alone: ‘Who takes the credit for the outputs 
and outcomes when donors leverage resources to implement 
programmes together?’ (implementer, Nigeria). 
Key to strengthening harmonisation between innovations 
was the effective functioning of government-led donor 
coordination mechanisms and the willingness of stakeholders 
to embrace them. Specifically, a Technical Working Group 
responsible for MNH in Ethiopia, the Health Partners’ Forum 
in Uttar Pradesh and Nigeria’s Maternal and Newborn Child 
Health Core Technical Committee. Our respondents highlighted 
differences across the three settings. In Ethiopia, interviewees 
acknowledged donor harmonisation was relatively strong; the 
Technical Working Group was becoming institutionalised, 
and had encouraged improved donor engagement and 
communication, although, interviewees also suggested that 
implementers’ involvement was often limited to providing 
technical inputs when requested. In Nigeria, partial donor 
and implementer harmonisation posed challenges to scaling-
up innovations: ‘Everybody is doing things in isolation; there’s 
no proper coordination…’ (implementer). Yet there were some 
reports that the donor forum was developing: ‘...integration 
among donors has improved...but there’s still a lot to be done...’ 
(implementer, Nigeria). In Uttar Pradesh, while the Health 
Partners’ Forum was nascent, mapping partner innovations 
and programmes had strengthened harmonisation, although 
a few respondents criticised donors for their partial 
engagement and state government for its leadership: ‘...the 
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kind of leadership required to make things move smoothly is not 
there’ (implementer, India). 
Transparency and Accountability: “…Trust Among Decision-
Makers and Care Providers” 
Transparency includes donors being open about their 
programmes and their impacts, and providing recipient 
governments with data that aligns with national health 
information, thereby improving their accountability to those 
governments. Such transparency can foster scale-up since 
better information flows from donors and implementers 
to government, and coordinated information flows among 
multiple donors and implementers strengthens government’s 
ability to make informed decisions about potentially scalable 
innovations. Further, better information sharing about 
innovations with government tends to foster trust, which 
interviewees suggested put development partners in a stronger 
position to advocate for their innovations to be scaled. This 
happened for a community care of sick newborns innovation 
in Ethiopia and a post-abortion care innovation in Nigeria. In 
the Nigerian example, an international NGO was transparent 
about evidence it found showing that a shortage of doctors 
able to administer post-abortion care in Nigeria was creating 
a backlog of women needing care, and then advocated for 
an innovation to train nurses in post-abortion care to help 
meet the need. Through being transparent about the evidence 
collected at each step, trust was built with policy-makers 
leading them to accept the link between this training and 
shorter waiting lists, which subsequently led to the inclusion 
of post-abortion care in the curriculum for nursing students 
so that the task shifting became institutionalised. 
In practice, implementers routinely established parallel 
monitoring and evaluation and information systems for 
innovations, rather than using - and potentially strengthening 
- government systems. Yet, respondents reported some 
progress towards better transparency. Ethiopia’s Technical 
Working Group was described as enabling transparency 
- which increased the chances of innovations being scaled-
up: ‘[It’s] the most important enabling factor’ (implementer, 
Ethiopia). Similarly, respondents reported that the Uttar 
Pradesh Health Partners Forum was starting to ‘encourage 
transparency’ (implementer, India) and evolving into a ‘sharing 
platform’ (multilateral donor, India) about innovations, 
from which ‘coordination between various actors…is likely to 
come’ (implementer, India). In Nigeria, attempts to improve 
transparency – including strengthening federal and state-level 
mechanisms for coordinating innovations – were described 
during the interviews as in their infancy. Nevertheless, the 
intention to improve transparency existed: ‘It’s no longer 
business as usual. People are asking questions, people want to 
be informed’ (multilateral agency, Nigeria).
Predictability: “Programmes Run Only as Far as Funding Is 
Available” 
Predictability includes donors being clear about how long 
governments can expect to receive funding and about 
anticipated future funding for an innovation, and also where 
possible, governments and implementers diversifying funding 
sources to create financial stability, so that innovations can 
continue and be scaled up. This may be more possible in 
middle-income countries like India and Nigeria, than in 
Ethiopia, which receives substantial external funding, but 
without some financial stability, it is difficult for recipient 
governments to plan long-term health spending commitments 
- including financing innovations introduced by externally-
funded implementers. Many interviewees highlighted the 
advantages of longer term and more predictable donor 
grants that, if forthcoming, would allow implementers to 
include a proper project planning phase, time and resources 
for effective advocacy and other scale-up activities, and for 
the innovation to develop and mature. It could also allow 
for committed time to support government to implement 
innovations at scale. 
In practice, short-term grants are common for MNH 
innovations, with timely commitments to future funding 
often unclear or unpredictable. Hence, implementers were 
in a permanent cycle of applying for funding, delivering 
projects under pressure and requesting no-cost extensions, or 
seeking funding from alternative donors to maintain services 
they had developed. Such grants were challenging for scale-
up, providing limited time to convince government of an 
innovation’s value: ‘By the time the programme starts showing 
results it is finishing’ (implementer, India). Additionally, 
erratic funding commonly led to interruptions in innovation 
services, which interviewees described as impacting negatively 
on community experiences of the health system, thereby 
jeopardising future prospects of scaling-up innovations: ‘…
when you create demand and there’s no supply you have people 
who are disillusioned - people who feel betrayed are not willing 
to access the system anymore’ (bilateral donor, Nigeria).
Problems of predictability varied between the settings. In 
Uttar Pradesh, relatively high levels of government funding 
for rural primary healthcare meant that fluctuations in donor 
funding had minimal impact – although implementers still 
faced the problems of short-term funding for innovations. 
In northeast Nigeria, donor projects had previously been 
supporting rural primary healthcare substantially, but the 
security situation in the region had led some donors to 
discontinue funding for innovations, because of the difficulty 
of achieving results in such circumstances. Speaking about 
the insurgency, a Nigerian government official said: ‘Donors 
are unwilling to go to areas considered as hot spots with a lot 
of uncertainties.’ In Ethiopia, domestic resources were more 
limited, with substantial external aid required to maintain 
health innovations, which were vulnerable to shifting global 
priorities: ‘…most innovations…succeed in their pilot phase, 
because of intensive resources…but not many do so when it 
comes to scaling implementation, after funders have pulled 
out’ (implementer, Ethiopia). To partially overcome funding 
uncertainties, some donors were contributing to Ethiopia’s 
pooled ‘Millennium Development Goals Performance Fund.’ 
This gave the government some flexibility to fund promising 
new innovations: ‘… [it] enables the ministry to fill gaps in their 
own health development programme,’ noted a bilateral donor, 
whose agency had decided that this was the best way to assist 
government efforts in the health sector.
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Civil Society Engagement and Participation: “People Are 
Beginning to Make Demands”
The recognition of civil society as key development actors is 
promoted in international aid effectiveness agreements.22,23 
Our respondents explained that civil society engagement 
in decision-making bodies such as donor coordination 
mechanisms reinforced efforts to scale innovations by giving 
NGOs a platform to advocate to government. If government 
is receptive to civil society this can mean it is more likely 
to respond favourably; indeed, a vibrant civil society is 
well placed to raise the profile of health issues such as 
MNH and encourage government to increase attention and 
financing. 
Interviewees in northeast Nigeria noted that NGO 
implementers were becoming participants in state-level 
decision-making with government, including decisions about 
allocating resources to MNH programmes and innovations: 
‘There’s a gradual shift by government in recognising the 
importance of citizens’ participation in decision-making 
within a democratic setting’ (implementer, Nigeria). In Uttar 
Pradesh, interviewees suggested that the political system 
was also becoming more responsive to civil society; the 
Health Partners’ Forum helped NGO implementers to start 
influencing health policy: ‘...civil society is now viewed as a force 
of change’ (academic, India). Similarly, civil society in Nigeria 
had a role in influencing some high-profile health decisions: 
‘The democratic space is now open for [civil society] to speak on 
issues, unlike in the past’ (implementer, Nigeria). Nevertheless, 
interviewees acknowledged that in that setting civil society’s 
ability to hold government to account was taking time: ‘many 
local [civil society organisations] are not aware of their power 
to hold government accountable’ (implementer, Nigeria). Civil 
society in Ethiopia is not as strong as in Nigeria and India, yet 
NGO implementers were described as starting to influence 
government if they worked together; ‘...collectively they can 
make a policy change...’ (multilateral donor, Ethiopia), or 
invoked more powerful actors such as UN agencies to help 
raise the profile of their work. 
Discussion
We found that the principles of aid effectiveness had a 
strong bearing on the scaling up of innovations in three very 
different economic and policy settings, raising important 
implications for scaling health innovations in LMICs. Where 
our interviewees noted positive examples of aid effectiveness 
these were mostly emerging trends that if strengthened would 
enhance the environment for scale-up. In contrast, poor 
adherence to aid effectiveness, such as lack of harmonisation, 
and unpredictability of aid reduced the likelihood of scale-up 
of donor-funded health programmes, raising questions about 
the value of short-term, donor-funded health innovations 
that are unlikely to have lasting substantial impact beyond 
implementation districts and timeframes. Moreover, short-
term health innovations that ‘bite the dust’ could be damaging 
if they placed an unnecessary burden on weak country health 
systems, including the workloads of frontline health workers, 
and led to communities being ‘disillusioned’ by health services 
dependent on erratic external funding. 
We identified key ways in which each of the three main groups 
of actors ― implementers, governments and donors ― may 
enhance the prospects of scaling up MNH innovations, not 
only through their own actions, but also through working 
together.
Implementers
The steps which health programme implementers take to 
maximise the chances of their innovations being scaled 
are highlighted in existing scale-up literature.4,6,7,10,12-15,28 
Implementers’ flexibility to respond to changing policy 
directions helps maximise alignment, a point also raised 
by Bhutta and Aleem,27 and something that donors might 
consider when deciding which groups to work with. While 
implementer actions and approaches, and the effectiveness of 
the innovation itself, are critical factors for scale-up, this paper 
also highlights the important role of recipient governments 
and donor agencies. 
Government
Our data show how recipient governments can establish 
conditions that enable scale-up including: taking ownership 
of externally-funded innovations by engaging in their 
design and development; taking strong leadership of 
donor coordination mechanisms to improve alignment, 
harmonisation, transparency and accountability; and being 
responsive towards civil society. Adoption varied across our 
study settings, perhaps unsurprising given their markedly 
different economic and political contexts. 
Ethiopia, classified by the World Bank as a low-income 
country eligible for concessional loans,36 is heavily reliant on 
external funding for its health system. While health policy 
Decision-making lies with national government, health 
system administration is being decentralised to woreda-level. 
The Ethiopian Government’s high prioritisation of rural 
MNH, together with strong Ministry of Health leadership over 
donor programmes, despite the country being highly reliant 
on external health funding, meant implementers needed 
to seek high levels of government ownership to implement 
any health innovations. Additionally, the Technical Working 
Group was reasonably strong in coordinating donor health 
programmes and encouraging information sharing. These 
emerging factors increased the prospects of government 
scaling externally-funded health innovations, although 
a relatively weak civil society had limited influence over 
government’s decision-making. 
In contrast to Ethiopia, India is classified as a lower-
middle income country, with the financial ability to borrow 
interest-bearing loans from the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).36 While the Indian 
Government makes over-arching national policy decisions, 
the devolved health system, means that individual states have 
autonomy over local policy implementation and decide how 
disbursements from central funds are spent. In Uttar Pradesh, 
high prioritisation of MNH in rural areas through the National 
Health Mission provided substantial state resources for 
funding the scale up of selected health innovations, with some 
backing from influential state level champions, whereas low 
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dependency on external funding meant donors had limited 
influence over health policies. The emergent, government-
led Health Partners’ Forum was starting to improve donor 
coordination including better information sharing about 
innovations, while civil society was described as becoming a 
‘force for change’ in influencing state government. 
Nigeria too is classified as a lower-middle-income country, 
yet its low per-capita income means that it is eligible to 
receive both concessional loans from the International 
Development Association and interest-bearing loans.36 The 
Nigerian, the health system is partially decentralised, in that 
in some states, the state ministries of health make policy 
decisions, yet delays in the disbursement of funds often 
hamper implementation. In northeast Nigerian states, rural 
primary healthcare was considered largely donor-driven 
and funded. Reported problems of financing not following 
government commitments undermined the prospects of state 
governments adopting externally-funded health innovations, 
although like Uttar Pradesh, civil society had started to 
influence government decisions in some states. 
Donors
Donor agencies have an important role in the scale-up 
of innovations since they have substantial influence over 
implementer behaviour. If donors choose to fund health issues 
that do not align with country-defined priorities, or continue 
to support vertical projects rather than broader health systems 
work, there is little to encourage country ownership.27,30,32 
Moreover, donor decisions affect the predictability of funding 
for innovations, in terms of whether they focus on shorter-
term projects, are willing to fund longer-term programmes, 
or contribute to pooled health sector funding.30,37 Donors’ 
demands on their implementers have implications for scaling-
up innovations, including expectations about achieving 
results within ambitious timeframes, and how implementers 
report to them, what indicators are reported and whether 
country monitoring and reporting systems are embraced.37 
Donors can contribute to transparency by making apparent 
what they are funding, the impacts of their programmes and 
stimulating transparency among their implementers.30,32,37 
Beyond funding, donors can also: assist national governments 
to strengthen their capacity for ownership for innovations, 
avoid duplicating procedures, and harmonise with recipient 
country processes,22 ensure alignment with national priorities 
and a long lead-in for planning an innovation’s transition to 
government.3
Limitations
Our paper focusses on the aid effectiveness principles as key 
factors influencing the scale-up of innovations. Yet, there 
are multiple other factors – including the scalability of the 
innovations themselves, the capability of government to adopt 
and scale the innovation, embedding scale-up in project plans 
and generating and presenting robust evidence effectively.4,11 
While it may not be possible to generalise our findings 
beyond our focus settings, they offer a useful snapshot in time 
of three contrasting settings. We have also generalised about 
highly diverse set of donors and implementers, in terms of 
their focus and approach, as going into this in more detail was 
beyond the scope of this study. Additional research would 
be of value to understand these issues in other settings and 
unpack different approaches to influence scale-up. 
The nature of qualitative research means that the questions 
asked in interviews and the way they were analysed and 
interpreted may have be prone to some degree of subjectivity. 
Counterbalancing this, the researchers were external to the 
projects and thus had no specific interest in presenting them 
in a positive or negative light, which we hope has meant that 
our reflections are objective. 
Conclusion
Our findings offer insights into how country ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, transparency and accountability, 
predictability, and civil society engagement and participation 
can enhance the environment for scaling-up MNH care 
innovations in diverse settings, despite limitations and 
variations in the practical implementation of the different aid 
effectiveness principles outlined. Our study suggests that the 
links between these six principles of aid effectiveness and the 
scale-up of healthcare innovations are explicit to each of the 
three settings and would merit further investigation, across a 
wider range of countries to draw out specific considerations 
for recipient governments, donors and implementers.
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